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A philosophical discussion on evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) can be probably perceived almost as an oxymoron. 
How can “the process of systematically finding, appraising, 
and using contemporaneous research findings as the basis 
for clinical decisions” (Jenicek 2012: 23) be compatible with 
the critical and systematic examination of fundamental prob-
lems such as the nature of being, reality, thinking, values and 
perception? How can a scientific field focused mainly on the 
search and evaluation of evidence and aimed at solid quan-
tifications of hypotheses (Jenicek 2003: 70) be approach-
able from a perspective that is characterized by probable or 
defeasible arguments? The challenge of this special issue 
is to show how a philosophical perspective on evidence is 
not opposed to, but rather at the grounds of evidence-based 
medicine.
The apparent conflict lies in the focus of the aforemen-
tioned definition, which stresses how the best evidence is 
obtained while almost neglecting the crucial reason why 
research, experiments, and trials are conducted, and evi-
dence and findings collected and systematically analyzed—
namely, a decision-making activity, a practice aimed at 
patient care and disease prevention (Montgomery 2005: 4). 
If we frame EBM within the broader perspective of medi-
cal practice, it becomes a specific type thereof, “in which 
the physician finds, assesses, and implements methods 
of diagnosis and treatment on the basis of the best avail-
able current research, their expertise, and the needs of the 
patient” (Jenicek 2012: 23). In this view, EBM is primarily 
a practice that is grounded firstly on the physician’s critical 
thinking and capacity to choose – among the overflow of 
information and scientific data—the course of action that 
is best suited to the case at hand. EBM, despite its stress 
on the quantified certainties of experiments, statistics, and 
collection of data, does not cease to be a contingent activity 
that is essentially based on practical reasoning—or phrone-
sis (Montgomery 2005: 4–5; Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 26). 
In this sense, EBM is far more than a mere body of scientific 
knowledge: it is the use of clinical judgment in the rational, 
clinically experienced, and scientifically informed care of 
sick people (Montgomery 2005: 33). This characterization 
of EBM is indeed the one that Sackett explicitly endorsed in 
his famous 1997 paper that opened the era of EMB (Sackett 
1997).
EBM is thus defined not only by its characteristic 
instruments, but more importantly by its agents and its 
goals. The physicians do not apply “the best evidence” in 
a deductive, mathematical fashion. Instead, they need to 
choose what evidence is most valuable for the case at hand 
(Jenicek 2003: 61), and this choice is always the product 
of reasoning under uncertainty, resulting from the incom-
plete or mistaken knowledge of the clinical problem and 
the patient in his or her complexity (Jenicek 2012: 15). 
Practical reasoning is what guides physicians in decid-
ing what information to neglect when the data are not 
coherent, what guidelines to follow—and whether to fol-
low them—based not only on their scientific grounds but 
more importantly their suitability to the circumstances of 
the case (Jenicek 2012: 28; Montgomery 2005: 17), and 
the patient’s values, culture, and preferences (Sackett et al. 
2000). Quoting Montgomery’s observation (2005: 16), 
“[a]lthough biological research now provides the content 
for much of medicine, clinical knowing remains first of all 
 * Fabrizio Macagno 
 fabrizio.macagno@fcsh.unl.pt
 Carlo Martini 
 martini.carlo@unisr.it; carlo.martini@helsinki.fi
1 IFILNOVA, Department of Philosophy, Faculdade de 
Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 
Av. de Berna 26C, 1069-061 Lisboa, Portugal
2 Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, 
Milan, Italy
3 Centre for Philosophy of Social Science, Department 
of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, 
Helsinki, Finland
 F. Macagno, C. Martini 
1 3
the interpretation of what is happening with a particular 
patient and how it fits the available explanations.”
The uncertainty of medicine and the practical nature 
of EBM bring this field into the realm of philosophy, and 
more specifically critical thinking and argumentation. 
Practical reasoning is characterized by its concrete, tem-
poral, and presumptive nature (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 
27). A practical conclusion is drawn only plausibly (not 
necessarily) from general presumptive principles or max-
ims (Montgomery 2005: 134)—not laws or rules—and 
factors that are gathered from experience, and is limited 
to the specific case. The core of medical practice is thus 
not the universal (theoretical or scientific) validity of a 
premise, but the defeasible nature of arguments (Jonsen 
and Toulmin 1988: 34–35):
Practical arguments depend for their power on how 
closely the present circumstances resemble those of 
the earlier precedent cases for which this particular 
type of argument was originally devised. So, in prac-
tical arguments, the truths and certitudes established 
in the precedent cases pass sideways, so as to provide 
“resolutions” of later problems. In the language of 
rational analysis, the facts of the present case define 
the grounds on which any resolution must be based; 
the general considerations that carried weight in simi-
lar situations provide warrants that help settle future 
cases. So the resolution of any problem holds good 
presumptively; its strength depends on the similarities 
between the present case and the precedents; and its 
soundness can be challenged (or rebutted) in situations 
that are recognized as exceptional.
 The logic of arguments becomes thus the core of the use of 
evidence, and the process that allows the connection between 
the generalizations drawn from the scrutiny of the best pos-
sible evidence (the current focus of EBM) and the medi-
cal practice, namely the use of such guidelines to address 
specific cases (Jenicek 2003: 449–452; Jenicek 2012: 28).
The decision-making dimension of EBM broadens the 
picture of this field to elements that have little to do with 
proofs, experiments, and statistics, but that are essential for 
the outcome – often more than the solidity of a treatment 
guideline (Jenicek 2003: 472). To be used to make deci-
sions about the care of patients, the best evidence-based 
research needs to be integrated with clinical expertise, the 
communication of symptoms, and the understanding of 
patients’ values (Sackett et al. 2000). Moreover, the concept 
of shared decision-making in clinical practice has modified 
the perception and more importantly the use of evidence in 
clinical practice. Evidence is being increasingly conceived 
as an instrument that is not purely under the physician’s 
“exclusive jurisdiction.” Sharing information and making 
evidence available to patients is regarded as fundamental 
for “supporting patients to consider different alternatives 
or priorities” (Elwyn et al. 2014) namely making informed 
decisions.
In this sense, evidence-based practice needs to address 
the problems of shared decision-making (Committee on 
Quality of Health Care in America 2001: chap. 6), grounded 
on the concepts of patient-centered care and patient engage-
ment (Elwyn et al. 2014; Elwyn and Miron-Shatz 2010; 
Epstein and Street 2011). Not only needs evidence to be 
shared with the patients (that is, adjusted to their background 
knowledge) but patient’s unique preferences, concerns, and 
expectations need to be integrated into clinical decisions or 
at least negotiated during the clinical session (Duffin and 
Sarangi 2018). To be functional, practical, and effective, the 
scientific approach to evidence needs necessarily to connect 
and combine with the realms of argumentation, communica-
tion, and education.
As already pointed out above, the role of argumentation 
is pivotal in this broader picture of EBM. Evidence is the 
basis of any discourse in health care because it plays a justi-
ficatory role in the arguments that are used and exchanged. 
Evidence plays the role of backing (Toulmin 1958; Erduran 
2008; Hitchcock 2003)—i.e.: the support of the reasons 
offered in favor of a conclusion (Upshur and Colak 2003; 
Pellegrino 1999). Proposals are argued for and against by 
physicians and patients relying on evidence; evidence, in 
turn, needs to be shared and debated. For this reason, not 
only does a theory of argumentation and argument evalu-
ation become crucial in health communication (Walton 
1985; Rubinelli and Schulz 2006), but also the different 
types of dialectical purposes investigated in argumentation 
theory can shed light on how evidence is discussed and used 
to achieve a communicative goal (Walton 1989). Depending 
on whether the interlocutors intend to share information, 
make or share a decision, negotiate, or persuade each other, 
evidence is used and evaluated in different ways.
Communication is essential for the goals of the argu-
mentative uses of evidence. In this rational, dialectical, and 
dialogical activity, evidence refers to two distinct logical 
elements (see Martini, in this volume). On the one hand, 
its meaning corresponds to the classical notion of scientific 
foundation of treatment guidelines and recommendations. 
On the other hand, it corresponds to the factual dimension 
of medical reasoning, and the information on the specific 
case that is interpreted and used for making a treatment 
proposal. In both cases, communication lies at the hearth 
of evidence use. In the first case, the argumentative use of 
evidence for decision-making depends on understanding, as 
evidence needs to be explained and communicated effec-
tively for making a shared decision grounded on patient’s 
preferences. By understanding how different recommenda-
tions are differently backed by distinct types of evidence, 
the patient can also understand the reason why a specific 
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treatment is recommended (Cummings 2015; Walton 2016). 
In the second case, the patient’s provision of the information 
needed by the physician depends on his or her understand-
ing of what counts as good or better evidence. Especially in 
chronic care, the distinction between the levels of evidence 
can allow patients to recognize symptoms from feelings or 
irrelevant observations.
Argumentation, communication, and education are inter-
twined in this medical decision-making process. Especially 
in chronic care settings, the decision-making is not only a 
prerogative of the physician: the patients are increasingly 
regarded as part of the decisions (Coleman et al. 2009; 
Wagner et al. 2001), and more importantly they need to 
make their own medical decision in their own manage-
ment of the disease  (Cavanaugh 2011). Communicat-
ing and more importantly teaching what evidence is and 
how it is evaluated and used are becoming the keystone of 
medical consultations (Edwards et al. 2012). The crucial 
role of communication is grounded on the trust relation 
between doctor and patient (Clark 2002; Kerse et al. 2004), 
especially in chronic care, where patient compliance often 
becomes crucial to the effectiveness of the cure (Roter et al. 
1998). The scientific dimension of evidence is thus only one 
of the many faces of evidence-based medicine. Communica-
tion and education are cornerstones of developing a trusting 
relation between doctors and patients; the treatment process 
becomes a two-way path in which the patient is an active 
participant as much as the doctor is.
In this context, in which the patient is not a passive recipi-
ent but an active collaborator in the cure, the role of the 
patient in medical decision-making opens specific chal-
lenges in the analysis of argumentative use and the assess-
ment of evidence. How can a patient decide in dilemmatic 
situations in which evidence established through statistical 
and quantitative means is in conflict with medical expertise 
(Montgomery 2005: chap. 1)? A medical expert may give 
an opinion that is different from the official view shared 
among scientists or other experts. The patient will then be 
left with the conundrum of which evidence to rely on: the 
apparently transparent and logical evidence of the numbers, 
or the other kind of evidence consisting in the arguments the 
clinician might offer in support of her or his decision to stray 
from the numbers? In this scenario, it becomes important to 
understand how to integrate clinical expert judgment with 
evidence-based practices, and more importantly to learn how 
to assess expertise, and the weight of disagreement in medi-
cal argumentation.
The aforementioned dilemmatic scenarios that medical 
decision-making faces when it involves the main stake-
holder—the patient—, underscore the fundamental role of 
expertise. Evidence, without expertise and judgment, is of 
little use to science users, i.e., the patients, without argu-
ments supporting one or another conclusion in a clinical 
situation. But how do experts transmit evidence to the pub-
lic? What is their role as mediators between the evidential 
base of science and science users? Can we understand this 
role only as a sociological and, sometimes, political issue? 
Or is there a possibility for a methodology of expertise?
This special issue focuses on the relationship between 
argumentation and the critical use of evidence in medical 
decision-making. In particular, the research question is 
whether the current concepts and accounts of evidence and 
expertise are adequate for capturing the subjective, reason-
based and argumentative component of evidence-based 
medical science, as well as the role of experts as media-
tors and communicators. The papers that this issue collects 
take the reader through different and interrelated topics: 
Martini’s paper, presenting a philosophical analysis of two 
meanings of evidence, and how they are related to judg-
ment in EBM, is followed by Lawler and Zimmermann’s 
paper on the dangers of statistical hypothesis testing. The 
analysis of the logical and pragmatic dimension of progno-
sis (Chiffi and Andreoletti) and the communication thereof 
through metaphors (Salis and Ervas) lead to the crucial issue 
of how evidence is used in doctor-patient consultations, and 
how it is taught. The investigation of the different types and 
argumentative functions of evidence and the communica-
tive process of teaching evidence use (Macagno and Bigi) is 
complemented by a study focused on how evidence is under-
stood by the public, and how the development of the concept 
of evidence can affect evidence based reasoning (Miralda-
Banda, Garcia-Mila, and Felton). In the final paper, Walton, 
Oliveira, Satoh, and Mebane bring the issue of evidence 
to the dimension of computer-assisted decision-making, in 
which formal argumentation systems are used to combine 
and compare evidence-based recommendations to make 
treatment proposals in case of multiple morbidity.
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